D-Day: German Defenses
Defensive Doctrine
Nazi Germany had at its disposal 50 divisions in France and the surrounding Low Countries. All German armed forces in the West came under the command of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt as Commander-in-Chief West. He had two Army Groups under his command – Army Group B, in northern France and the Netherlands, and Army Group G in the South of France.
Under Rundstedt, the Germans had built the Atlantic Wall along 2,000 miles of the European coastline. It utilized 17 million cubic yards of concrete and 1.3 million short tons of steel. To put that in perspective, that is enough concrete to build 270 Empire State Buildings and enough steel to construct 160 Eiffel Towers.
Army Group B contained the Seventh Army, defending Normandy and Brittany, and Fifteenth Army, north of the River Seine (Sin). The army group was commanded by the legendary general Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who was one of Hitler’s favorites. He had been transferred from the Italian theater specifically to beef up the defenses of the Atlantic Wall.
When he arrived in 1943, Rommel ordered a massive strengthening of the existing fortifications, adding pillboxes, gun emplacements, beach obstacles, and millions of mines. In some places, the defenses were extended inland to cover possible access routes and glider landing areas. He did such a good job that the invasion planners switched their focus from landing during high tide to low tide. With this change, the anti-ship obstacles would be more visible, but the soldiers would have to traverse more open sand before they could find cover.
For months Rundstedt had complained that top units had been pulled from his command and sent to defend the Italian peninsula and support the fighting on the Eastern Front. This limited the combat effectiveness and available reserves for the forces deployed along the Cotentin peninsula.
At this point in the war, German soldiers were on average six years older than their Allied counterparts. Many of these soldiers in the Normandy area were conscripts and volunteers from Turkestan, Russia, Mongolia, Poland, and other Baltic countries that surrendered to the Germans. The Wehrmacht (or German defense force) had provided them mainly with unreliable captured equipment, and they lacked motorized transport.
In a great piece for Military.com called “When Hitler Snored,” Joseph Micallef details the German’s defensive doctrine. He writes: “Germany military doctrine called for a threefold approach to the Normandy landings: a mobile defense-in-depth, augmented by significant local striking power to hold the allied invaders in check. Then, a mobile strategic reserve could be brought to bear for a decisive counterattack and a battle of annihilation. The mobile reserve would be positioned well to the rear of the front line to prevent it from being committed prematurely and allowing it to be directed in a rapid thrust against the main force's weak points.”
The defeat of the Allies would hinge on the nine panzer divisions and one panzergrenadier division in theatre, with a total of 1,400 tanks and self-propelled guns.
Furious Disagreement
Doctrine aside, there was significant discord among the leadership of Army Group B on the execution of the Normandy defense. Rommel wanted a big Panzer punch aimed at the invaders while they were still on the beach.
Steven Zolga, in his book “The Devil’s Garden,” discussed Rommel’s viewpoint. Rommel argued that the invasion force had to be destroyed in the water and on the beaches, where they would have little cover or fire support. He proposed a strategy of static defense along the coasts, backed by concrete pillboxes and overwhelming firepower.
Rommel wanted to deploy the Panzer units to support the infantry as a local tactical force that could strike against weak points in the Allied line. The tanks could be deployed to seal any breaches in the German lines. He believed, correctly, that it would take the Allies some time to build up their tank strength on the beaches and that, in the first 48 hours of the landings, the Germans would have an overwhelming advantage in armor.
Rommel feared that Allied air superiority would expose the panzers to devastating fighter-bomber attacks, which would hinder their movement. He also believed that the morale of the infantry manning the beach defenses would be strengthened by the presence of elite formations supporting them.
Rommel wanted the 12th SS Panzer Division, for example, to be stationed at Isigny rather than at Evreux. That would have placed it less than 10 miles from Omaha Beach rather than 110 miles to the east.
In contrast, Rundstedt believed it was important to keep the Panzers in reserve until they can be deployed in force against the known inland weak points of the enemy forces. Lessons from other Allied invasions showed that the tanks and other responding forces could be knocked out by close support from naval bombardment.
Rommel appealed directly to Hitler, who made a confusing decision that would doom the defensive effort. Rommel was given operational control of just three panzer divisions, only one of which was close to the Normandy coast. The other two were held north of the Seine. Three more divisions were assigned to Army Group G in the South of France, far from the action.
The four other Panzer divisions were separated from local command and control.
Micallef writes that: “The armored forces in the west were separate from Rundstedt's command. They were organized into Panzer Group West, under the command of Gen. von Schweppenburg, and reported directly to Hitler. Any operational deployment of the Panzer divisions had to be confirmed by Hitler himself.”
Episode 1: Panzer Punch Reshapes D-Day
Re-imagine the invasion of Europe through Operation Overlord in Episode 1: Panzer Punch Reshapes D-Day.
We look at the tenuous hold the Allies had on D-Day. And we envision what would have happened if Hitler was awake and released the nine Panzer divisions.
